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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between religion and home bias.
We propose a simple theoretical framework that suggests that countries
interacting via their representative individuals might show a certain de-
gree of religion-driven international altruism that in turn a¤ects trade. We
test these predictions exploiting data from a survey on religious attitudes
and individualspreferences over consumption of home-produced versus
foreign goods that we designed and carried out in 15 di¤erent countries.
We nd evidence that religious openness and home bias are negatively
correlated. This appears to provide some support to the hypothesis that
religious openness, through trust and altruism, may have a pro-trade ef-
fect.
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1 Introduction
The home bias e¤ect (HB) is a well-documented phenomenon that arises in in-
ternational nance and trade (French and Poterba, 1991; Tesar and Werner,
1995; McCallum, 1995) and refers to a preference for goods and services that
are home produced. Home bias constitutes an intangible barrier between coun-
tries that hampers the e¤ectiveness of governmentse¤orts to promote trade.
Despite its relevance, the causes of home bias are not yet fully understood.
Home bias can be partly explained by both physical and bureaucratic barri-
ers between countries such as transportation costs (Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 2000),
international tari¤s and duties (Frankel et. al, 1995; Heliwell, 1998; Lewis,
1999), exchange rate risks (Stulz, 1981; Adler and Dumas, 1983) and asymmet-
ric information (Ahearne et al., 2004; Stulz, 2005). Nonetheless, the literature
acknowledges that there is a residual share of home bias that still remains unex-
plained (Lewis, 1999; Bradford and Lawrence, 2002; Sercu and Vanpee, 2007).
Part of the unexplained component of home bias may depend on an individuals
embeddedness in a social network. Some authors have suggested that the degree
to which individuals are enmeshed in a social network might a¤ect trust and
ultimately inuence economic choices (Butler et al., 2009; Guiso et al., 2006 and
2009).
Religion is an important part of an individuals life and provides the basis
for social aggregation and the development of intangible networks. Religion
can a¤ect people through personal involvement, the inuence of peers and local
religious groups and institutions and also via the impact it may have on polit-
ical decisions. Historically, sharing the same religious a¢ liation has helped to
promote and enforce cooperative behaviours. For example, during the Middle
Ages Maghribi traders successfully managed long-distance trade in the Mediter-
ranean region as the common religion increased mutual trust within merchants
belonging to the same religious network (Greif, 1989, 1992, 1993, 1994). Leeson
(2005) provides a similar argument about trade in pre-colonial Africa where
social proximity, signalled by religion and other social attributes, was the main
support for trade. In contemporary societies religion appears to be related to
trust and altruism (Schoenfeld, 1978; Bahr and Martin, 1983; Guiso et al., 2006;
Ho¤, 2010; Henrich et al., 2010) and these have important e¤ects on economic
activities and trade (Knack and Keefer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997; Guiso et
al., 2009; Forsythe et al., 1994; Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2006; Laury and Taylor,
2008; Tabellini, 2008).
The aim of this paper is to explore whether embeddedness into a religious
network inuences individualsattitudes towards home bias. First, we propose a
theoretical framework that outlines the relationship between religion and home
bias. In this model, countries interacting via their representative individuals
show some degree of religion-driven international altruism that, in turn, a¤ects
trade. Second, we present individual-level information on religious attitudes
and home bias drawn from a pilot survey that we have designed and carried
out in fteen countries. To the best of our knowledge this is the rst survey
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that attempts to collect comprehensive information on di¤erent dimensions of
religious attitudes and home bias1 . Finally, we exploit this information and
analyze empirically the inuence of religious attitudes on home bias.
In the past the relationship between religion and economic behaviour has
captured the attention of prominent scholars such as Adam Smith and Max
Weber2 . More recently the literature on the relationships between religion,
economic activities and growth has ourished rapidly (Blum and Dudley, 2001;
Ekelund et al., 2002; Barro and McCleary, 2003, 2005; Guiso et al., 2003; Glaeser
et al., 2004; Cavalcanti et al., 2007; Becker and Woessmann, 2009). A stream
of studies has focused on the nature of religious organizations, the "religious
market", its "competitiveness" and how these inuence religious participation.
According to these studies, in the spirit of Adam Smiths work, religious de-
nominations compete in the market to attract a¢ liates or maximize alternative
objective function s (Iannacone, 1992, 1998; Hungerman, 2011; Finke and Stark,
1988, 1989; Voas et al., 2002; Montgomery, 2003; Gruber and Hungerman, 2008).
Previous studies have also analysed the impact of religion on international trade.
Lewer and Van den Berg (2007a,b) employ a gravity model that allows for re-
ligion to explain pairwise international trade ows between countries. These
studies attempt to disentangle institutional and network e¤ects of sharing a
common religion. Helble (2007) also uses a gravity approach but focuses on
specic religious denominations and their impact on trade. His ndings high-
light that religious openness, measured by the variety of religions in a country,
is among the most important determinants of bilateral trade. Both Lewer and
Van den Berg (2007 a,b) and Helble (2007) aim at identifying the impact of
shared religious a¢ liations on country-level trade ows. Guiso et al. (2009)
focus on the inuence of culture on trade. The authors employ several proxies
of cultural traditions, including sharing a common religion, to explain bilateral
trust. They nd that culture a¤ects bilateral trust and that this has a large
impact on both trade and investment between countries. Finally, Benjamin et
al. (2010) attempt to identify the e¤ects of religious a¢ liations on a series of
economic attitudes using individual level data collected through experiments
on individualscontribution to public goods. The use of experiments is mainly
due to the lack of both data and sound empirical evidence on the inuence of
religion on economic choices. According to their results, Protestants appear to
be more inclined to pay for public goods, while lower risk aversion may explain
the level of contribution of Catholics.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, our theoreti-
cal framework o¤ers a description of the complex interactions between religion,
altruism and home bias through a two-stage game model between countriesrep-
1This study is part of a larger research project that aims at exploring the relationships be-
tween religion, culture and home bias in comparative perspective. The questionnaire presented
here is a pilot for a future broader survey.
2Adam Smith in his seminal book The Wealth of Nations (1776) is believed to be the
rst author to have analyzed religion as a market. Max Weber (1930) famously argued that
the Protestant ethic was crucial for the development of own enterprises and the accumulation
of wealth in Northern Europe.
3
resentative individuals. Second, we focus our analysis at the individual rather
than aggregate level and examine the inuence of individualsreligious attitudes
on a series of individual-level choices that dene home bias (e.g. labour mar-
ket decisions and choices about consumption of goods and services and cultural
media). Moreover, di¤erently from previous studies, we go beyond the associ-
ation between religious a¢ liations and trade by accounting for a wider set of
attitudes towards religion such as religious openness, intensity of belief and the
importance of religion in an individuals life.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates our theoretical frame-
work while section 3 presents the survey we have designed and the data we have
collected. Section 4 illustrates the empirical strategy and its results. Section 5
concludes.
2 A simple theoretical approach to religion and
home bias
We present a simple theoretical framework that describes the relationship be-
tween religion and home bias. The starting point is a simple two-country model
based on the analysis of institutional governance provided by Dixit (2009). The
model shows how in each country individuals religious openness may gener-
ate more cooperative behaviour and lower cultural barriers towards goods and
services produced in a foreign country.
In our model income (y) is generated by the representative individuals pro-
duction e¤ort (x). The production e¤ort may be enhanced by the extent of
the representative individuals degree of openness (z). Openness measures the
individuals political favour towards free trade, the competition of foreign con-
sumption patterns and competition from foreign fellow workers. Openness may
be considered as benecial, yet costly, to individual welfare if it is reciprocated.
Therefore, partner countriesopenness boosts further the per capita income of
a community which eventually makes for a larger welfare. In this context, each
country representative individual may take into consideration the welfare of
partner countries. This corresponds to a form of international altruism. We
assume that the extent of reciprocation is related to religious openness. These
considerations are embedded in the ensuing formal relationships.
The representative individual in country i derives her income yi according
to the following relation:
yi =
0BBBB@1 +
2X
k=1
zk
2
1CCCCAxi (1)
with i = 1; 2 countries engaging in reciprocal trade and constituting the world.
zi is the openness commitment of each individual in country i and xi is the
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individual e¤ort commitment or the extent of resources individually devoted
to production. Then, from the above relationship it appears that the internal
commitment to production can be magnied in terms of income according to
the degree of openness of the country itself and of partner countries.
The representative agent in each country has a utility function which may
look as follows:
ui = yi   (zi + xi)2 + rirjuj 8 i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i (2)
where ui is the utility or welfare of the representative individual of country
i; while  2]0; 1] is a discomfort sensitivity parameter. The quadratic form in
brackets is due to the nonlinearity of the discomfort that is in turn due to both
e¤ort and the interaction with the willingness to be open. The third part of
(2) is associated to altruism (Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2006; Tabellini, 2008). We
introduce cross border altruism in the collective utility function assuming that
each country appreciates the welfare of partner countries. In other words we
think of countries as not rival but, on the contrary, somewhat altruist3 . This sort
of collective altruism may interact - i.e., may be enhanced or decreased by the
extent of religious openness (ri;j 2 (0; 1)) in all countries, which is represented
by an index of religious openness of one individual multiplied by the same index
of the foreign agent. In other words, the utility of a representative individual
of country i grows with the utility of individual of country j and the extent
of religious openness in both countries. Following this assumption we will be
able to introduce a relationship between religion and willingness to be open, the
opposite of home bias. The religious openness index may be seen as the extent
of cross border altruism of a country towards other communities as a result of
the attitude towards religion.
Representative individuals interact as Nash players to maximize their utility
using two controls: openness and e¤ort. The timing of the game is as follows.
First, countries decide the amount of openness. Second, they set their optimal
production e¤ort. The game is solved using standard backward induction with
sub-game perfection. In that case, the resulting equilibrium may be described
in its properties and comparative statics, in the following:
Proposition 1 (i) Suppose that countries interacting via their representative
individuals, show some degree of religion-driven international altruism. Then,
there may exist an international equilibrium in e¤orts and openness with non
negative levels of both, non negative per capita income and individual welfare.
(ii) Religion a¤ects the extent of altruism and interacts with openness. A higher
degree of religious openness increases trade openness at home and abroad. More-
over religious openness leads to a higher income.
Proof. (i) We proceed by getting the reduced forms of each countrys repre-
3This altruism may simply be the awareness of the median voter of a country that openness
is good and home bias and/or mercantilism is bad.
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sentative individual welfare function:
ui =
2[(xi + zi)
2 + rirj(xj + zj)
2]  (xi + rirjxj)(2 + zi + zj)
2(r2i r
2
j   1)
;
The two countriesrepresentative individuals maximize their respective utility.
A Nash equilibrium of the two stage game in both production e¤ort (x) and
openness (z) may be found. The equilibrium utility and production for country
i and j are:
xi =
4
6+ rirj(2  1)  1 = x

j ;
zi =
1 + rirj   4
6+ rirj(2  1)  1 = z

j ;
ui =
(rirj + 1)(1 + rirj   8)
(rjri   1)(1 + rirj   2(3 + rirj))2 = u

j
yi =
8(1 + rirj)
2
[6  1 + rirj(2  1)]2
= yj
The non-negativity of the two endogenous variables z and x; for any ri;j 2 [0; 1);
requires that:
 2 [1; 2]
where 1 =
rirj 1
6+2rirj
and 2 =
1+rirj
4 : The same holds for u

i;j and y

i;j .
(ii) As for the comparative statics results, we may show that
@zj
@ri
=
8rj
2
[6  1 + rirj(2  1)]2
 0;
@zj
@rj
=
8ri
2
[6  1 + rirj(2  1)]2
 0;
@xj
@ri
=
4rj(1  2)
[6  1 + rirj(2  1)]2
 0
@xj
@rj
=
4ri(1  2)
[6  1 + rirj(2  1)]2
 0
@ui
@ri
=
rj[(1 + rirj)
3   2(1 + rirj)2(7 + rirj)+ 32(2 + rirj(1 + rirj))2]
(rirj   1)2[6+ rirj(2  1)  1]3  0
@yi
@ri
=
8rj
2[1 + 2+ rirj(1  2)]
[ 1 + 6+ rirj(2  1)]3  0:
Cross e¤ects are:
@ui
@rj
=
ri[(1 + rirj)
3   2(1 + rirj)2(7 + rirj)+ 32(2 + rirj(1 + rirj))2]
(rirj   1)2[6+ rirj(2  1)  1]3  0
6
@yi
@rj
=
8ri
2[1 + 2+ rirj(1  2)]
[ 1 + 6+ rirj(2  1)]3  0:
The signs hold in the feasible set, i.e., for  2 [1; 2].
Discussion
Religions may be associated to trade openness if they increase cross-border
altruism. This has a benecial inuence on income and feeds back on the pro-
ductive e¤ort. Religious openness motivates individuals to be more altruistic,
reducing the relative cost of discomfort. As for cross e¤ects, religions may sup-
port partner countrys income and overall welfare. This is a further e¤ect of
international altruism induced by religious openness. Then, religious openness
should be associated to lower levels of home bias.
3 Data
In this section we present individual-level data on religious and economic atti-
tudes obtained through a survey questionnaire that we designed and collected.
We subsequently use this data to examine empirically the relationship between
religion and home bias. Copies of the questionnaire were distributed to students
in 16 universities of 15 countries during the period 2008-20104 . After collecting
the data, our nal sample consists of 1849 individuals. With the exception of
Finland (76), Argentina (86), Ukraine (95) and Japan (99), we received more
than 100 completed questionnaires from each country (see Table 1). The largest
amount of replies were obtained from Germany (200), followed by India (162)
and Italy (148).
The survey focuses on a series of questions that attempt to proxy both
religious attitudes and home bias56 . More specically, religious attitudes are
identied through a set of questions that attempt to dene religious openness;
the relevance of religion in an individuals life; religious intensity; as well re-
ligious a¢ liation Home bias is captured by questions that aimed at revealing
individualspreferences in three main dimensions: labour market decisions; con-
sumption of home-produced versus foreign goods and services (including health
care); and interests in foreign cultures and consumption of foreign media. The
4The questionnaire was distributed in the following universities and countries: University
of Bologna in Buenos Aires, Argentina; Zhejiang University in Hangzhou, China; University
of Turku, Finalnd; University of Marseille - Aix en Provence, France; University of Hamburg,
Germany; National Law School in Bangalore, India; Univeristy of Bologna in Forlì, Italy;
Recanati Graduate School of Business Administration in Tel Aviv, Israel; Ryukoku University,
Japan; University Carlos III in Madrid, Spain; University of Lausanne, Switzerland; Bilgi
University in Istanbul, Turkey; Kiev School of Economics, Ukraine; University of York, United
Kingdom; Brown Univesity and New York University at Binghampton, United States.
5The English language version of the questionnaire used in the US is available in Appendix
A.
6The questionnaire was issued in the language predominantly used during lectures of each
university (e.g. English in India, etc.).
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survey also contains questions on respondentsdemographic characteristics such
as age, gender and nationality7 .
Table 1: Number of respondents by country
Argentina 86 Japan 99
China 130 Spain 114
Finland 76 Switzerland 139
France 103 Turkey 101
Germany 200 Ukraine 95
India 162 UK 138
Italy 148 USA 144
Israel 114
Descriptive statistics
Religion and religious attitudes
Tables 2 displays basic descriptive statistics and claries the content of the
questions about religion and home bias.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
The largest percentage of respondents (26%) considers themselves as be-
lievers, although they report not attending religious services. Atheists are
the second-largest group (21%) followed by believers attending services (14%).
About a third of the respondents have attended services from religions they do
not share and about a quarter of the entire sample of respondents self-report
reading holy texts from other religions. Even though 55% of individuals report
being believers, the amount of those who wish to have the state comply with re-
ligion on matters such as abortion is relatively low (18%). 10% of individuals in
the sample would favour the state to support religion (one or the most professed
ones) and to have religion a¤ecting politics (10%); the same percentage would
like a state religion. Also, 39% would like religious principles to be taught at
school.
Only 16% of our sample of respondents wishes religion to be a guide for the
welfare state. The low importance attributed to religion in public choices and
moral guidelines is also reected by the low percentage of those who believe
religion has a high importance for their private matters (20%). Almost half of
respondents (44%) think home-based rms should trade with a country without
religious freedom. Only 20% think that there should denitely be no trade with
countries with no religious freedom.
As for religious a¢ liations, Christians represent the largest religious group (with
7Questions on individual or household income have not been included due to the impor-
tant share of missing answers in a related previous survey, reported in Reggiani and Rossini
(forthcoming).
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15.7% of Catholics 10.2% of Protestants and 10% on other non-specied Chris-
tians). The largest non-Christian groups are formed by Hindus (9.1%) and Jews
(8.2%). Members of Orthodox churches constitute the smallest groups with 5.8%
of respondents while non-believers amount to up 7.5% of our respondents.
Overall, replies also indicate that despite the relatively large percentage of be-
lievers, about one third of them neither respects nor thinks positively of strong
believers. Moreover, less than 20% consider religion to o¤er guidance for im-
portant personal and institutional issues such as abortion and the welfare state.
Nonetheless, a good disposition towards strong believers touches almost half
of the sample. This might mean that religion is considered as an important
phenomenon to be open to, yet not much to comply with.
Proxies of home bias
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics and contents of the questions related
to home bias.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
Home bias and labour market choices
We have included two questions about the respondentswillingness to accept
a temporary job abroad (up to three years) with the same work conditions as
in the home country. 47 % of individuals in our sample would accept such a job
o¤er. This percentage increases to 65% when we consider a foreign wage a 20%
higher than the home salary8 .
Home bias and consumption of home versus foreign goods and services
We ask respondents to choose between buying a nationally manufactured
and/or branded car or a foreign car with analogous features. According to our
interpretation, a preference for the home manufactured car may signal a po-
tential home bias. In our sample, 40% of respondents would prefer to buy a
nationally branded/produced car. We put a similar question related to food
consumption. 55% of individuals in our sample would prefer to buy locally
produced over imported food. However, attitudes towards food consumption
may relate to other factors such as preferences for fresher locally grown food or
environmental concerns. In order to identify preferences over consumption of
health care, we ask respondents whether they would prefer to be treated by a
local rather than a foreign doctor. The majority of individuals in our sample
appears to distrust foreign doctors. This may partly conrm at individual level
what has been observed before at macro level suggesting that countries are more
open to trade goods than services (Nordas, 2010).
8A 20% wage gap with respect to a home-based job may seem a low compensation for
leaving the country; however, our sample is composed by young students, well-raised in a
time of increasing globalization and cultural exchanges. This could partly explain the high
percentage of individuals willing to accept this type of o¤er.
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Home bias, foreign culture, media culture and international socialization
Aggregate "home bias" appears to decrease when considering cultural issues.
25% of individuals in our sample prefer national writers, 48% watch news from
foreign broadcasters and only 7% declare no interest in foreign cultures. On the
contrary, 76% of respondents travelled scantily abroad during the last 2 years,
while a good portion has foreign friends (42% have between 1 and 5 foreign
friends while 43% has more than 5).
Previous surveys on aspects of religion and home bias
The World Value Survey (2005) is a primary source of data and a refer-
ence point for the study of many aspects of culture and well-being, including
religion9 . The last wave of the survey contains two questions that are com-
parable to ours (Importance of religion in private life; Religion as guidance to
welfare state). Another question (Belief in hell) was included in the Economist-
YouGovPolymetrix (2008) survey on Anglo-Saxon attitudes. On top of that,
our survey covers aspects of the religious sphere (religious openness, a¢ liation
importance in life, intensity of belief) and home bias (home bias in the labour
market, in the goods, services markets and in the cultural choices) providing
information that could not be otherwise accessed. A comparison of the frequen-
cies registered in the comparable questions is reported in Appendix B; given the
nature of our sample, however, no conclusions should be drawn from these.
4 Empirical analysis
We analyze data drawn from our survey to provide evidence on the relationship
between religious attitudes and home bias. More specically, in this section we
test whether the embeddedness into a religious network (dened through a series
of attitudes towards religion as well as religious a¢ liation) is correlated with
home bias. Home bias is identied through individualslabour market choices
and preferences towards consumption of health care, and home-produced versus
foreign goods and services. As suggested by our theoretical framework we expect
religious openness to be negatively correlated with home bias: a higher degree of
religious openness should decrease home bias. However, the intensity of religious
feelings might have either a positive or negative e¤ect on home bias. It should
be noted that the empirical analysis proposed here is only concerned with the
correlation between religious attitudes and home bias and that at this time we
do not attempt to identify causal e¤ects10 . However, the analysis presented
9A number of studies (e.g. Chuah et al., 2009; Guiso et al., 2009) use the World Value
Survey as a direct or indirect benchmark.
10The identication of causal e¤ects would require the use of longitudinal (panel) data.
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here is perhaps the rst empirical exploration of the hypothesis that religious
attitudes might inuence home bias.
We employ a series of standard probit models to analyse the correlation
between four di¤erent dimensions of home bias (labour market choices; con-
sumption of home-produced goods; choices over health care services provided by
national versus foreign doctors and choices concerning consumption of cultural
media) and religious attitudes. Religious attitudes are dened in terms of the
extent of religious openness/tolerance; the importance of religion in an individ-
uals life; and religious a¢ liation (Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Hebraism,
Islamism, using the category no religion as a baseline). We also include a series
of variables about the intensity of religious beliefs (if an individual denes him-
self as a believer attending services; a believer not attending services; a believer
with no specic religious a¢ liation; a syncretist; an agnostic and use atheist as
base category). We control for demographic characteristics (age and gender) and
a series of geographical variables (whether the individuals is a foreign student
and the macro geographical area of the sample of origin: North, Central, South-
ern and Eastern Europe; North America; South America; and Asia). Finally,
we also include in our regressions a set of country-specic macroecononomic
variables imputed using publicly available data from the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)11 . For each country in our survey, these
variables contain GDP, the size of trade in the economy as a percentage of
GDP, unemployment rates, female labour participation rates and an index of
research power12 . We impute these variables because we believe that individ-
uals home bias may be smaller the richer is a country, the more open is a
country to trade, the higher its research power. Also, individualshome bias
in labour market choices may be negatively related to unemployment and the
extent of female labour participation. A full description of the variables used in
this analysis and their summary statistics are reported in Appendix C.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
Table 4 reports the marginal e¤ects of the probit models13 . Models 1 and 2
analyse the e¤ect of religious attitudes on labour market choices. Individuals are
asked whether they would accept a temporary job abroad with the same working
conditions and salary (Model 1) and whether they would accept a temporary job
abroad with the same working conditions but a higher salary (Model 2). Mod-
els 3 and 4 present choices between home-produced and foreign goods (car and
food, respectively) while Models 6, 7, 8 reveal preferences over foreign media,
cultures and novels. Finally, Model 5 identies individualspreferences towards
the use of health care (national versus foreign medical doctors). The dependent
variables of these models are all dummy variables that proxy home bias, taking
value 1 when an individual is not willing to accept a job abroad, prefers home
11All these variables refer to the year 2008 (the rst year the survey was issued) and
are available at the World Bank website (http://data.worldbank.org/) and the IMF website:
(http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm).
12The index used is R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP of the country.
13Complete tables featuring all explanatory variables are available upon request.
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produced cars and food, has been attended by native medical doctors and has
never been interested in the fruition of foreign media. In the specications pre-
sented in this table, we concentrate on the e¤ects of religious openness and the
importance of religion in an individuals life on home bias. The set of variables
about religious openness (Service, Holy Text and Believer) are dummy variables
coded as increasing in closeness. Accordingly, a positive e¤ect of these variables
would imply that closed views on religion are associated with home bias. The
group of variables on the relevance of religion (Abortion, Support, Welfare, Pol-
itics, Trade Freedom, State, School and Private) are dummy variables coded as
increasing in the importance of religion. In this case, a positive e¤ect of these
variables would entail that the higher is the importance of religion the greater
is home bias.
In four out of eight specications, the variable Service displays positive and
statistically signicant marginal e¤ects. Accordingly, having never attended a
service of another religion is associated with home bias in choices concerning
the labour market (Models 1 and 2) and consumption of cultural media (Models
6 and 7). Also, refusing to read a holy text from a di¤erent religion (Holy
text) appears to display positive and statistically signicant marginal e¤ects
in the models concerning the fruition of cultural media (6 and 7). The third
dummy identifying religious closedness (Believer, individuals that do not think
positively nor respect individuals who dene themselves as strong believers)
seems to show a weaker e¤ect on our home-bias revealing choices. Overall, this
appears to provide some evidence that closed views on religion are positively
associated with home bias. The e¤ects of the importance of religion appear
to be more mixed. Although this is somewhat consistent with our prior, it
makes di¢ cult to draw rm conclusions. For example, the importance of religion
appears to be negatively associated with home bias for choices related to home
branded/produced cars (Welfare in Model 3) whereas it seems to be positive
correlated with home bias for choices concerning food (Welfare in Model 4).
This might also imply that the importance of religion on an individuallife may
lead individuals to have di¤erent preferences depending on the various domains
of home bias.
The e¤ects of religious a¢ liation on home bias also appear to present some
mixed results. For example, Christians appear to present some tendencies for
home bias only in specic domains. According to our models, they seem to pre-
fer home doctors and to be less interested in the use of foreign media (Models
5 and 7). However, Christians also seem to be interested in foreign cultures in
general (Model 7). Individuals dening themselves as Hindu appear to display
the most consistent tendency towards home bias, although this is true for a
limited number of models/home bias domains (labour market choices and food;
Models 1, 2 and 4). Further, Buddhist and Muslim appear to display a generally
negative correlation with home bias (food and cultural media; Models 4 and 7).
It is worth noting that these results appear to di¤er slightly from the e¤ects of
religious denominations on trade identied previously in the literature. These
di¤erences, however, may be partly explained by the fact that we consider mul-
tiple domains of home bias rather than aggregate measures of trade; moreover,
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we account for a wider set of religious attitudes. Finally, a lower religious in-
tensity appears to be negatively correlated with home bias (see models 1, 2, 6
and 8).
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides a rst investigation of the relationship between religion and
home bias using both a theoretical framework and evidence from a survey that
we designed and collected. Whereas the previous literature has focused primarily
on the e¤ects of religious denominations on bilateral trade ows, we analyze the
inuence of a series of religious attitudes on di¤erent domains of home bias. In
particular, this paper attempts to establish whether and how attitudes towards
religion, through altruism and trust, inuence individual preferences for home-
produced versus foreign goods and services..
We employ a simple two-country theoretical framework and show that reli-
gious driven international altruism should increase trade openness and reduce
home bias. We explore this empirically using new data from a pilot survey
handed out to students of 16 universities throughout 15 di¤erent countries. Ac-
cording to our empirical analysis, religious openness and home bias appear to
be negatively associated within most home bias domains. This nding seems
to support the hypothesis that religious-rooted altruism may have a pro-trade
e¤ect and, hence, decrease home bias. We also nd that the importance of re-
ligion in an individuals life may drive individuals to have di¤erent preferences
towards home bias depending on the di¤erent domains of home bias considered.
Moreover, religious a¢ liations appear to have less clear-cut e¤ects on individu-
alseconomic choices than previously identied in the literature on religion and
trade. Overall, our results appear to corroborate the hypothesis that religion
can play an important role in dening home bias. Our empirical ndings also
highlight the importance of accounting for di¤erent religious attitudes beyond
simple religious a¢ liation when analysing the relationship between religion and
home bias. As individuals appear to display di¤erent preferences towards home
bias, they also suggest the need of accounting for di¤erent domains of home
bias.
More denite conclusions can be only achieved by collecting more data
on these issues. In particular, our study could be extended and improved
by using representative samples of the population of the di¤erent countries
analysed. Also, longitudinal data could allow studying the dynamics of the
religious openness-home bias relationship.
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Appendix A
The questionnaire: English language version for the US
PART I
 Please specify your age........................................................
 Please specify your sex MALE FEMALE
 Would you be willing to accept a TEMPORARY (max. 3 years) job in
a foreign country for the same salary and work conditions of your home country?
YES NO NOT SURE
. . . and for a salary at least 20% higher? YES NO NOT SURE
 Between a US made car and a car made outside the US with similar
features and same price, which one will you prefer?
US FOREIGN INDIFFERENT
 Do you prefer to buy locally produced rather than imported food?
LOCAL IMPORTED INDIFFERENT
 If you needed a doctor and had the choice between one from the US
and one from the rest of the world (ROW), which one would you prefer?
US ROW INDIFFERENT
 Do you prefer to read novels by writers of your nationality? YES
NO NOT SURE
 Do you watch foreign TV news / read foreign newspapers / use other
foreign media?
OFTEN RARELY NEVER
 Do you consider yourself as being interested in foreign cultures? YES
NO NOT SURE
 How many times did you travel to a foreign country during the last 2
years?
[<5] [5-10] [>10]
 How many foreign friends do you have? [NONE] [1-5] [6-10] [>10]
 Would you mind the US trading with a country where there is no
religious freedom?. . . . . . . . . . . .
YES NO DO NOT KNOW.
 If a country raises trade barriers against US, what would you suggest?
WAIT RETALIATE IGNORE
 What is your nationally? US FOREIGN
PART II
 As to religion, do you consider yourself as:
- a believer regularly attending services of your confession [ ]
- a believer not attending services [ ]
- a believer with no religious a¢ liation [ ]
- a syncretist (believe in the fusion of many religions) [ ]
- an atheist [ ]
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- an agnostic (existence of God cannot be proved) [ ]
- other ............
 Did you ever attend services of a religion which is not yours,
- in your home country? ONCE MORE THAN ONCE NEVER
- during a journey abroad? ONCE MORE THAN ONCE NEVER
 Would you read holy texts of religions which are not yours? YES
NEVER
 Should religion give you guidance to questions such as abortion? YES
NO NOT SURE
 Should religion give you guidance to questions such as the welfare
state? YES NO NOT SURE
 On the whole, how important do you think religion in general is for
your private life?
VERY IMPORTANT NOT VERY IMPORTANT NOT IMPORTANT
AT ALL
 Do you respect or think positive of people who consider themselves as
strong believers?
RESPECT THINK POSITIVE BOTH NEITHER NOT SURE
 Do you believe that there is a hell, where sinners who do not repent
their sins go when they die?
YES I DO NO I DONT NOT SURE
 Do you think one religion should be actively supported by the state?
YES NO NOT SURE
 Do you think that most common religions should be actively supported
by the state?
YES NO NOT SURE
 Do you think religion should have some inuence on politics? YES
NO NOT SURE
 Should your country trade freely with a state without religious free-
dom? YES NO NOT SURE
 Should there be a state religion in your country? YES NO NO
OPINION
 Do you think that religious principles should be taught at school?
YES NO NO OPINION
 If you wish, please name your religious a¢ liation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Appendix B
Comparison with other surveys
Table B.1: comparison with the World Values Survey (2005)
Importance of Religion Country Guidance to Welfare
Our Study WVS Our Study WVS
15.9 21.0 UK 16.0 -
21.6 34.4 Italy 10.8 50.5
35.6 74.7 Turkey 23.8 57.2
7.0 - Israel 7.1 -
33.6 18.3 Ukraine 23.1 63.5
13.7 17.1 Switzerland 3.6 58.1
22.3 13.0 France 3.7 -
20.5 11.2 Germany 28.5 70.4
18.4 14.9 Spain 14.3 75.6
20.4 6.7 China 23.1 -
10.5 17.6 Finland 7.9 61.5
30.9 62.3 India 28.4 61.5
5.1 6.5 Japan 4.0 92.4
19.2 47.4 USA 14.3 56.1
Table B.2: comparison with the Economist poll, belief in hell
Economist Our study
US UK US UK
Yes 54.0 16.0 30.0 15.0
No 27.0 57.0 43.0 44.0
Not Sure 19.0 27.0 23.0 38.0
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Appendix C
List of variables used in the empirical analysis
 Home bias proxies
Job Abroad: dummy identifying individuals with no willingness to accept a
temporary job abroad for the same salary as at home.
Job Abroad 20: dummy identifying individuals with no willingness to accept
a temporary job abroad for a salary 20% higher than at home.
Car: dummy identifying individuals with preference for the home made
(brand) car.
Media: dummy identifying individuals that never watch foreign TV news /
read foreign newspapers/ use other foreign media.
Doctor: dummy identifying individuals with preference for the home doctor.
Food: dummy identifying individuals with preference for locally produced
food.
Culture: dummy identifying individuals with no interest for foreign cultures.
Novel: dummy identifying individuals with preference for novels written by
writers of same nationality.
 Religious openness/closedness proxies
Service: dummy identifying individuals that never attended a service of
another religion.
Holy Text: dummy identifying individuals with no willingness to read a holy
text of a di¤erent religion.
Believer: dummy identifying individuals that neither think positive nor re-
spect a person that describes himself as a strong believer.
 Importance of religion proxies
Abortion: dummy to signal an individual who thinks religion should give
guidance on questions like abortion.
Welfare: dummy to signal an individual who thinks religion should give
guidance on questions like welfare.
Private: dummy to signal an individual who thinks religion is very important
for their private life.
State: dummy to signal an individual who thinks that one religion should
be actively supported by the state.
Support: dummy to signal an individual who thinks the most common reli-
gions should be actively supported by the state.
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Politics: dummy to signal an individual who thinks religion should have
some inuence on politics.
School: dummy to signal an individual who thinks that religious principles
should be taught in school.
Trade Freedom: dummy to signal an individual who thinks that his country
should trade freely with a state without religious freedom.
 Religious a¢ liation
Christian: dummy identifying individuals describing themselves of Christian
religion.
Hindu: dummy identifying individuals describing themselves of Hindu reli-
gion.
Jewish: dummy identifying individuals describing themselves of Jewish reli-
gion.
Buddhist: dummy identifying individuals describing themselves of Buddhist
religion.
Muslim: dummy identifying individuals describing themselves of Muslim
religion.
 Religious intensity
Atheist: dummy identifying individuals describing themselves as atheists.
Agnostic: dummy identifying individuals describing themselves as agnostic.
Syncretist: dummy identifying individuals describing themselves as syn-
cretist.
No a¢ liation: dummy identifying individuals describing themselves as be-
lievers with no a¢ liation.
No attendance: dummy identifying individuals describing themselves as be-
lievers not attending services of their religion.
Attendant: dummy identifying individuals describing themselves as believers
attending services of their religion.
 Demographic characteristics
Sex: dummy identifying a female individual when taking value 1.
Age: declared age of the individual in years.
 Geographic characteristics
North Europe: dummy to identify the Finland and UK samples.
Centre Europe: dummy to identify the France, Germany and Switzerland
samples.
South Europe: dummy to identify the Italy and Spain samples.
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East Europe: dummy to identify the Ukraine sample.
Middle East: dummy to identify the Israel and Turkey samples.
Asia: dummy to identify the China, Japan and India samples.
South America: dummy to identify the Argentina sample.
North America: dummy to identify USA sample.
Country: dummy identifying a home student when taking value 1.
Small Size: dummy variable identifying a student coming from a country
with a population of less than 15 millions.
Medium Size: dummy variable identifying a student coming from a country
with a population between 15 and 50 millions.
Large Size: dummy variable identifying a student coming from a country
with a population of more than 50 millions.
 Aggregate economic indicators
Trade: trade as a percentage of GDP, World Bank data, 2009.
GDPpc: GDP per capita, World Bank data, 2009.
Labour Female: female participation rate to the labour market, World Bank
data, 2009.
Unemployment: unemployment rate, World Bank data, 2009.
R&D: expenditure in research and development as a percentage of GDP,
World Bank data, 2009.
[INSERT TABLE C.1 HERE]
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Table 2. Religious attitudes 
Religious openess  
Attended services of other religion in your country ...in a foreign country
Once More Never Once More Never
524 257 932 301 221 1092
30% 15% 53% 17% 13% 62%
Read holy text of other religions Respect or think positive of strong believers
Never Yes Not sure Both Respect Think pos Neither Not Sure
455 979 265 273 416 177 587 263
26% 56% 15% 16% 24% 10% 33% 15%
Religious importance
Religion as guidance for abortion Religion as guidance to welfare state
Yes No Not Sure Yes No Not Sure
313 1082 321 286 1097 333
18% 62% 18% 16% 63% 19%
One religion supported by state Should religion have influence on politics
Yes No Not Sure Yes No Not Sure
129 1397 205 178 1429 125
7% 80% 12% 10% 82% 7%
Trade with country without religious freedom Should common religions be supported by state
Yes No Not Sure Yes No Not Sure
776 394 549 239 1138 295
44% 22% 31% 16% 65% 17%
Shdould religious principles be taught at school Importance of religion in private life
Yes No No opinion Very Not very Not at all
688 799 265 356 746 609
39% 44% 15% 20% 43% 35%
Religious intensity
Believer - "Do you consider yourself as a ..."
Believer attending services %            Believer not attending services % Believer with no affiliation %
237 452 255
14% 26% 15%
Syncretistic Atheist Agnostic
101 371 226
6% 21% 13%
Table 3. Home Bias Indicators
Labour Market
Willing to take up a job abroad… ...for a 20% higher salary
Yes No Not Sure Yes No Not Sure
820 502 410 1146 225 356
47% 29% 23% 65% 13% 20%
Consumption of goods and services
Would you buy a local brand car Prefer local over imported food
Yes No Not Sure Yes No Indifferent
705 348 694 971 62 510
40% 20% 40% 55% 4% 29%
Prefer local over non-local doctor
Yes No Indifferent
983 121 637
56% 7% 36%
Foreign culture and international socialization
Prefer writer of own nationality Interest in foreign cultures
Yes No Not Sure Yes No Not Sure
445 692 603 1453 116 174
25% 39% 34% 83% 7% 10%
Follow foreign media How many friends from abroad
Yes No Not Sure None 1 to 5 6 to 10 10+
834 154 760 255 736 242 505
48% 9% 43% 15% 42% 14% 29%
No. of travels abroad in last 2 years
5 or less 5 to 10 10+
1337 310 85
76% 18% 5%
          (1)        (2)          (3)         (4)        (5)         (6)         (7)         (8) 
 Job Abroad Job Abroad 20 Car Food Doctor Media Culture Novel 
         
Religious openness 
Service 
 
0.0620** 
 
0.0315** 
 
-0.0393 
 
-0.0175 
 
-0.000206 
 
0.0283*** 
 
0.0260*** 
 
0.0310 
 (0.0276) (0.0160) (0.0313) (0.0318) (0.0307) (0.00926) (0.00887) (0.0252) 
Holy Text 0.0496 0.0273 -0.0225 -0.00155 -0.0472 0.0671*** 0.0671*** 0.0495 
 (0.0344) (0.0225) (0.0361) (0.0351) (0.0364) (0.0203) (0.0215) (0.0314) 
Believer 0.0280 -0.00513 -0.0579* -0.0305 -0.0169 -0.0128 -0.00103 -0.0197 
 (0.0319) (0.0184) (0.0338) (0.0369) (0.0343) (0.00964) (0.0103) (0.0280) 
Importance  
Abortion 
 
-0.0227 
 
0.0144 
 
-0.0103 
 
-0.00959 
 
-0.0483 
 
0.0124 
 
0.0177 
 
0.00514 
 (0.0398) (0.0261) (0.0445) (0.0478) (0.0442) (0.0190) (0.0183) (0.0371) 
Welfare -0.0593 -0.00384 -0.100** 0.141*** -0.00711 -0.0143 0.00379 0.0404 
 (0.0365) (0.0226) (0.0408) (0.0405) (0.0430) (0.0126) (0.0148) (0.0367) 
Support -0.0279 -0.0293 -0.0521 -0.00590 -0.0325 -0.00769 0.0114 -0.0171 
 (0.0342) (0.0188) (0.0381) (0.0391) (0.0388) (0.0120) (0.0144) (0.0304) 
Politics 0.0973** 0.0102 0.0415 -0.0157 0.0105 -0.00780 0.000371 0.0229 
 (0.0492) (0.0286) (0.0509) (0.0517) (0.0492) (0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0406) 
Trade freedom 0.0403 0.00573 0.0315 -0.0803*** 0.000466 0.00963 -0.00492 0.0297 
 (0.0264) (0.0163) (0.0286) (0.0292) (0.0285) (0.00942) (0.00924) (0.0241) 
State 0.0181 -0.0291 0.0744 0.0475 0.0764 0.0190 -0.00572 0.0336 
 (0.0520) (0.0267) (0.0590) (0.0570) (0.0552) (0.0275) (0.0167) (0.0495) 
School 0.0495* 0.0370* 0.00681 0.0363 -0.0181 0.0123 -0.0164 0.0288 
 (0.0295) (0.0190) (0.0314) (0.0329) (0.0312) (0.0111) (0.0101) (0.0268) 
Private -0.0199 -0.0144 0.0480 -0.0150 0.0773* -0.0180 -0.0109 0.0552 
 (0.0384) (0.0216) (0.0442) (0.0462) (0.0418) (0.0126) (0.0124) (0.0386) 
Affiliation 
Christian 
 
0.00839 
 
-0.0154 
 
-0.00604 
 
-0.0552 
 
0.1000*** 
 
0.0426** 
 
-0.0246** 
 
0.0299 
 (0.0388) (0.0236) (0.0398) (0.0433) (0.0385) (0.0189) (0.0121) (0.0358) 
Hindu 0.163* 0.165** -0.0394 0.172*** 0.0289 0.0619 -0.00441 0.0115 
 (0.0856) (0.0800) (0.0818) (0.0621) (0.0798) (0.0981) (0.0210) (0.0663) 
Jewish 0.0863 -0.0297 0.125 -0.0565 0.00629 0.00812 -0.00443 -0.0263 
 (0.0787) (0.0396) (0.0887) (0.0797) (0.0823) (0.0296) (0.0204) (0.0612) 
Buddhist -0.0458 -0.0154 0.0308 -0.0546 -0.0402 0.00535 -0.0288*** 0.124 
 (0.0784) (0.0409) (0.0908) (0.0977) (0.0923) (0.0257) (0.00869) (0.0891) 
Muslim 0.139 0.0816 -0.0598 -0.166* 0.00659 0.0494 -0.0321*** 0.0988 
 (0.0915) (0.0787) (0.0827) (0.0969) (0.0837) (0.0795) (0.00787) (0.0836) 
         
 Intensity 
Agnostic 
 
 
0.0589 
 
 
0.00243 
 
 
0.0716 
 
 
0.0105 
 
 
-0.0662 
 
 
0.00508 
 
 
0.0101 
 
 
-0.0362 
 (0.0472) (0.0281) (0.0483) (0.0466) (0.0475) (0.0152) (0.0180) (0.0375) 
   Syncretist -0.120*** -0.0594*** 0.0152 0.0448 -0.0922 -0.00451 -0.00501 -0.0202 
 (0.0458) (0.0206) (0.0650) (0.0606) (0.0632) (0.0177) (0.0192) (0.0482) 
No Affiliation -0.0395 -0.0288 0.0738 0.0340 -0.0407 -0.0205* 0.0211 -0.0439 
 (0.0414) (0.0227) (0.0468) (0.0482) (0.0466) (0.0106) (0.0194) (0.0354) 
No Attendance 0.0237 0.0115 0.0264 0.0788* 0.0195 -0.0118 0.0200 -0.0732** 
 (0.0444) (0.0279) (0.0473) (0.0464) (0.0469) (0.0129) (0.0186) (0.0362) 
Attendant 0.133** 0.0406 0.0612 0.0112 0.0144 -0.0172 0.0585 -0.0431 
 (0.0663) (0.0429) (0.0658) (0.0654) (0.0635) (0.0151) (0.0392) (0.0477) 
 
Observations 
 
1,515 
 
1,517 
 
1,527 
 
1,438 
 
1,523 
 
1,357 
 
1,452 
 
1,520 
Log Likelihood -790.3 -505.5 -910.3 -309.0 -969.9 -801.9 -291.1 -692.5 
         
         
        
        
        
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4. The effects of religious attitudes on home bias  
  
 
Table C.1 Summary statistics of variables used in the empirical analysis  
 Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Age 1820 22.763 4.945 17 64 
Sex 1829 0.465 0.499 0 1 
Country 1697 0.854 0.353 0 1 
Size 1698 2.389 0.800 1 3 
GDPpc 1845 27014.680 13799.144 2868 47155 
Trade 1845 63.188 21.073 29 101 
Unemployment 1845 7002.844 2274.329 3500 11325 
Female Labour 1845                           50.29106 10.7632 25 68 
R&D 1845 2.031 1.137 1 5 
Job Abroad 1817 0.303 0.460 0 1 
Job Abroad 20 1813 0.140 0.347 0 1 
Car 1832 0.402 0.490 0 1 
Food 1627 0.628 0.483 0 1 
Doctor 1825 0.570 0.495 0 1 
Novel 1825 0.252 0.434 0 1 
Media 1845 0.085 0.278 0 1 
Culture 1827 0.063 0.244 0 1 
Travel 1812 0.774 0.419 0 1 
Friends 1823 0.144 0.351 0 1 
Service 1845 0.721 0.448 0 1 
Holy Text 1782 0.264 0.441 0 1 
Believer 1802 0.244 0.430 0 1 
Abortion 1799 0.182 0.386 0 1 
Welfare 1798 0.175 0.380 0 1 
Support 1802 0.169 0.375 0 1 
Politics 1814 0.103 0.303 0 1 
State 1813 0.076 0.264 0 1 
School 1814 0.388 0.487 0 1 
Private 1795 0.214 0.410 0 1 
Trade Freedom 1801 0.459 0.498 0 1 
Hindu 1845 0.060 0.238 0 1 
Buddhist 1845 0.025 0.158 0 1 
Orthodox 1845 0.029 0.169 0 1 
Agnostic 1845 0.014 0.116 0 1 
Muslim 1845 0.049 0.215 0 1 
Atheist 1845 0.027 0.162 0 1 
Jewish 1845 0.051 0.220 0 1 
Christian 1845 0.328 0.470 0 1 
No Religion 1845 0.092 0.289 0 1 
North America 1845 0.073 0.260 0 1 
South America 1845 0.047 0.211 0 1 
North Europe 1845 0.116 0.320 0 1 
South Europe 1845 0.142 0.349 0 1 
Centre Europe 1845 0.240 0.427 0 1 
East Europe 1845 0.052 0.222 0 1 
Mid East 1845 0.117 0.321 0 1 
  
Asia 1845 0.215 0.411 0 1 
Attendant 1784 0.141 0.348 0 1 
No Attendance 1784 0.276 0.447 0 1 
No Affiliation 1784 0.147 0.355 0 1 
Syncretist 1784 0.061 0.240 0 1 
Atheist 1784 0.212 0.409 0 1 
Agnostic 1784 0.136 0.343 0 1 
Small Size 1845 0.185 0.388 0 1 
Medium Size 1845 0.193 0.395 0 1 
Large Size 1845 0.543 0.498 0 1 
N 1845     
      
      
 
 
